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Overview Chapter 8:  
The impact of public policies on European fertility  
Jan M. Hoem 
1 
Abstract  
This chapter outlines the positions in the current debate about the possibility of using 
public policies to influence fertility. We note the polarization between, on the one hand, 
those who view public policies as obvious means for lifting the currently low fertility 
levels in Europe, in line with the role of economic policies in a modern society; and, on 
the other hand, those who feel that family policies are inefficient, and perhaps even 
unnecessary. We place the contributions of the national chapters of this book in this 
framework and describe the formidable methodological difficulties that face those who 
seek  to  investigate  policy  impacts  on  fertility  behavior.  While  properly  conducted 
empirical investigations have overcome such problems and have clearly demonstrated 
policy effects in specific circumstances, we conclude that, in general, national fertility 
is possibly best seen as a systemic outcome that depends more on broader attributes, 
such as the degree of family-friendliness of a society, and less on the presence and 
detailed construction of monetary benefits. 
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1. Introduction, the polarization of demographic opinion  
The recent sharp decline in fertility and the subsequent stability of low-level fertility in 
many  European  countries  have  generated  a  new  interest  in  identifying  means  to 
counteract  further  declines,  and,  if  possible,  to  induce  an  increase  in  fertility  back 
toward  the  replacement  level.  The  discovery  of  these  developments  has  served  to 
concentrate people’s minds, both in the media and among policymakers, on the national 
as well as the international level. (For a typical case from the press, see Süddeutsche 
Zeitung  2006.  For  national  and  international  contributions,  see,  for  example,  the 
accounts in the chapters in this book on Austria, the Czech Republic or Italy, and papers 
from the European Commission 2005, 2006.) In many countries, it is possible to detect 
a  re-awakened  willingness  to  adopt  instrumental  considerations,  and  to  pay  less 
attention to the moral stance that once dominated the attitudes of policymakers in the 
shadow of past abuses by fascist and other authoritarian regimes. (See our chapters on 
Germany,  Spain,  Italy,  and  Romania.  See  also  Prskawetz  et  al.  2006,  Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 2006, Kühn and Palme 2005, and Auth and Holland-Cunz 2006.) There is now 
more talk about the need to prevent the rapid aging of the population, and less about 
how the unique sanctity of private life pre-empts policies that can increase fertility.  
Many demographers are impatient with what they see as inadequately strong or 
inconsistent government policies. (See our chapters on Austria, Italy, Lithuania, and 
Poland.)  Such impatience is interesting in view of the current polarization of opinion 
concerning the possibility of using fertility politics to affect childbearing behavior. A 
conviction that public policies can correct for recent fertility decreases (see below) has 
been countered with the argument that the types of pronatalist policies that would be 
considered  acceptable  in  modern  democratic  societies  are  both  expensive  and 
ineffective.  The  latter  opinion  has  actually  long  been  held  by  many  professional 
demographers. The futility of using public policies as a tool to raise long-run fertility in 
Europe  (and  elsewhere)  has  been  asserted  particularly  eloquently  by  Paul  Demeny 
(1986, 2003, 2005), who has, in addition, maintained in recent conference discussions 
that  natural  mechanisms  of  homeostasis  will  make  deliberate  pronatalist  efforts 
unnecessary. The view that family policies have little impact has also been repeated 
most recently by Gauthier (2007, p. 339), who finds it difficult to understand why baby 
bonus  schemes  are  so  popular  among  governments,  given  her  interpretation  of  the 
evidence  she  presents  in  an  extensive  literature  review.  In  Gauthier’s  opinion,  the 
effects of public policies tend to be small, and any effect they may have works on the 
timing  of  fertility  (which  she  seems  to  regard  as  less  important),  rather  than  on 
completed  family  size  (which  many  regard  as  the  ultimate  goal  of  family  policies). 
Similarly, several chapters in this book maintain that public policies have influenced Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 10 
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fertility only mildly, or have been quite inefficient. (See in particular the chapters on 
France, Russia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine.)  
Western society would have been quite different if economists were equally timid 
in offering their opinions about the usefulness of economic policies. The pessimism 
shared by so many demographers flies in the face of such basic facts as the systematic 
differences in fertility levels and fertility trends in the various parts of Western Europe. 
(See  Esping  Andersen  1999,  Lewis  1992,  Gornick  et  al.  1997,  Sainsbury  1999, 
Anttonen and Sipilä 1996, Castles 2003; for a recent overview, see Neyer 2003a.) One 
would  assume  that  the  higher  fertility  rates  observed  in  France  and  in  the  Nordic 
countries are neither innate to these cultures nor a gift from heaven, but are somehow 
related  to  their  deliberate public  policies.  French  policies  have  long  been  explicitly 
pronatalist,  as  is  made  evident  in  the  chapter  on  France  included  in  this  book.  By 
contrast, the motivations behind corresponding policies in the Nordic countries have 
been  formulated  as  considerations  for  social  justice,  gender  equality  and  women’s 
empowerment;  they  have  also  been  seen  as  efforts  to  further  diminish  remaining 
differentials in income and wealth. The policies are pronatalist in effect, but not by 
stated intention. (See the chapter on Sweden in this book. Many of our chapters for 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe contain accounts of pronatalist policies that 
also go hand-in-hand with gender equality aspirations.) In both cases, the end product is 
a fertility rate  (specifically, a total cohort fertility rate, CFR) that is high by European 
standards.  Conversely,  one  would  assume  that  the  low  fertility  rates  of  the 
Mediterranean countries are, in part, a consequence of the lack of operational attention 
effectively paid to the need for systematic support of the family in a modern society, as 
is made clear in the corresponding chapters in this book. Automatic mechanisms of 
homeostasis are not easily visible, but, if they were present, would not public policies 
be a necessary part of any system to regulate fertility developments? 
Typically, the gloomy view that dismisses the possibility of influencing fertility is 
not shared by economists like Björklund (2006), who claims that his results suggest that 
the policies “raised the level of fertility, shortened the spacing of births, and induced 
fluctuations in the period fertility rates”. The pessimistic view also loses credibility as 
the weight of evidence, as interpreted by demographers like McDonald (2002, 2006) 
and others,
2 indicates that policies that are pronatalist in effect have indeed had an 
impact.  It  is  possible  that  the  contradictory  readings  of  the  facts  may  be  rooted  in 
different understandings of what aspects of fertility one should focus on, and which 
public policies one should count. A further issue is how an impact should be measured. 
We now turn to a discussion of such issues.  
                                                            
2 For a further overview, see, for example, Neyer (2003b, Appendix). For additional contributions concerning 
the much-studied policy effects in Sweden and their contrasts with other countries, see Neyer (2006a), Neyer 
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2. Methodological issues  
Empirical investigations use a variety of data sources and a range of methodologies. 
Also, even well-founded empirical studies of policy effects are up against a number of 
difficulties.  Let  us  spell  out  problematic  issues  connected  to  (1) methodology,  (2) 
endogeneity,  (3)  the  (im)possibility  of  providing  counterfactual  examples  and 
(4) context as follows:  
 (1) The first major issue that the analyst of policy effects is confronted with is the 
choice of statistical methodology. This pertains both to the choice of dependent variable 
and to the selection of covariates when any “independent variables” are available. Here 
are some considerations:  
(a) Despite the  well-known  weaknesses of a statistic  like the period TFR as a 
temporal measure of the fertility level, this is used as the outcome variable in many 
investigations,  in  a  tradition  going  back  to  the  beginning  of  modern  studies  of  the 
fertility-level/family-policy nexus. Conclusions about fertility effects could be firmer if 
more adequate statistics were used for analysis. 
(b)  When  more  complete  statistics  are  available,  fertility  analysis  is  normally 
based  on  cohort  data  by  preference,  and  statistics  such  as  the  cohort-based,  age-
accumulated completed fertility rate (CFR) are used. More complete analyses use age-
partial  CFRs  (which  are  cohort-based,  age-specific  fertility  rates  cumulated  up  to 
strategically chosen ages, sometimes separately by birth order; see, for example, Frejka 
and Sardon 2004 and 2007). 
(c) Moreover, demographers actually disagree about the absolute supremacy of 
cohort  data  over  period  data  (Ní  Bhrolcháin  1992).  Period  data  reflect  short-term 
effects, including policy effects of the kind the analyst is looking for, while cohort data 
are complementary and reflect longer-term developments. For example, the analysis of 
period data (Andersson 2005, Hoem 2005) has revealed that an ideologically motivated 
rigidity in the Swedish family policy rules has created great swings in Swedish fertility 
rates,  while  in  Finland  the  swings  may  have  been  avoided  through  countervailing 
effects of a home care allowance (Vikat 2004). Because of the priority given to policies 
that  induce  mothers  to  avoid  leaving  their  jobs  even  temporarily  to  work  as 
homemakers, Sweden  has  not had  such an allowance, except as a brief experiment 
during a short-lived center right government in the mid-1990s. Otherwise, motherhood 
benefits in Sweden have been closely linked to a woman’s own labor income. In such a 
system,  benefits  fluctuate  as  incomes  rise  and  fall,  and  fertility  oscillates 
correspondingly. Such swings may have serious consequences for society: the school 
system, for example, would have to adjust to greatly varying cohort sizes. It has not 
been shown that such swings are related to the ultimate level of fertility for a birth 
cohort, but it is apparent that policy regulations do influence other aspects of fertility. It Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 10 
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is  important  to  note  that  policy  impacts  on  fertility  extend  beyond  the  impact  on 
ultimate cohort  fertility. Indeed, exclusive concentration on the CFR  may lead to a 
different fallacy, namely, to a fixation on the lifetime end product of childbearing (the 
“quantum of fertility”), and to a lack of attention to important timing effects.  
(d)  Ultimately,  the  causal  structure  of  policy  effects  cannot  be  determined  by 
aggregate  statistics  alone.
3  With  aggregate  statistics,  the  analyst  is  confined  to 
aggregate-level  variation  in  time  and  space,  and  that  is  far  from  enough  for  causal 
conclusions.  If  individual-level  childbearing  histories  are  available,  the  options  are 
much  wider. (See, for example, Kravdal 1996 and Hank and Kreyenfeld 2003, and 
many other more recent papers.) For example, analyses of individual-level data have 
demonstrated  that  so-called  speed-premium  effects  have  reduced  birth  intervals 
noticeably in Sweden.
4 (In classical demographic reasoning, this should work toward 
increasing  aggregate  ultimate  fertility,  or,  at  least,  of  helping  to  prevent  a  further 
decline.) A second case in point is the most thorough empirical paper on the effects of 
childcare availability that we have seen to date (Rindfuss et al. 2007), in which the 
authors suggest that there may be local factors that affect both fertility and childcare 
supply. They demonstrate that policy effects may even come out with the wrong sign if 
local confounders are not taken into account. The authors conclude that it is essential to 
pay  attention  to  model  specification  when  conducting  studies  of  policy  effects  on 
fertility. 
(2)  The  last  paper  mentioned  illuminates  the  problem  that,  in  principle, 
endogeneity may dog any investigation of cause-and-effect in demography. This means 
that even when a first-blush hypothesis posits that policies influence behavior, it may 
also  be  necessary  to  allow  for  the  possibility  of  a  causal  influence  in  the  reverse 
direction,  i.e.,  for  the  possibility  that  demographic  behavior  may  influence  public 
policies. For example, policies might respond to an actual or anticipated trend in birth 
behavior. Thus, while it is commonly assumed that the availability and quality of public 
childcare influence childbearing behavior, it may instead be the case that regions with 
high  levels  of  childbearing  tend  to  develop  more  and  better  childcare  institutions.
5 
Politicians naturally cater to their constituencies, and regions with many children may 
be able to attract more political attention than other regions, with consequences for 
financial allocation. This may then, in turn, attract more families who want children. In 
principle,  potential  parents  may  migrate  to  take  advantage  of  the  availability  of 
childcare facilities if they are unevenly allocated across locations. This would make 
                                                            
3 For a concurring position, see, for example, Neyer and Andersson (2007). 
4 The latest contribution about this feature was given by Andersson, Hoem, and Duvander (2006). 
5 In this connection it is important to realize that the availability of care should not be measured by the 
absolute number of daycare slots, but by the provision rate. That rate standardizes for the number of children. 
Therefore one needs to argue that regions with high fertility expand public daycare over-proportionally. We 
are grateful to Michaela Kreyenfeld for underlining this distinction to us in a private communication. Hoem: Overview Chapter 8: The impact of public policies on European fertility  
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such migration endogenous to fertility, and, presumably, it would work to exaggerate 
policy effects unless the role of migration as an intermediate process is accounted for in 
the  analysis.  Forgetting  about  two-way  influences  almost  always  results  in  biased 
conclusions. 
Another  example  of  the  dangers  of  ignoring  endogeneity  has  appeared  in 
connection  with  regulations  concerning  non-marital  births.
6  In  1998,  the  German 
government started allowing unmarried parents to have joint custody of their children; 
non-marital  parenthood  increased  subsequently.  It  is  unclear,  however,  whether  the 
changed regulations caused non-marital fertility to increase, or whether the government 
just responded to the general trend in non-marital childbearing.  
(3) A third difficulty inherent in any kind of demographic study is that the analyst 
rarely has any counterfactuals at hand to demonstrate effects. If a counterfactual is not 
available, it is impossible to know what would have happened if a policy had not been 
implemented, or if it had been formulated in a different manner. A pronatalist policy 
can,  therefore,  easily  be  judged  ineffective  when,  in  reality,  the  policy  may  have 
counteracted a fertility decline that would have occurred in its absence, in which case 
the policy should have been counted as a success. Fortunately, natural experiments do 
occur  when,  for  example,  neighboring  populations  are  subject  to  closely  similar 
economic trends but have different public policies, as was the case in the comparison 
between Sweden and Finland mentioned in item 1c above. Differentials between social 
groups  in  reaction  to  the  Swedish  speed  premium  may  be  another  example.  (See 
Andersson, Hoem, and Duvander, 2006, and their predecessors.) A further opportunity 
for comparison can be found in a before-and-after analysis when a major reform is 
introduced in a country, as when the three-year parental leave (the APE) for mothers of 
two children was introduced in France. (See the chapter on France in this book.) There 
may also be unexpected side effects of reforms made with quite different intentions, 
such as the peak in marriages following the Swedish widow's pension reform in 1989 
(Hoem  1991),  or  the  increase  in  marriages  that  occurred  in  France  in  1996  after  a 
change in the tax system for unmarried couples with children. The law was intended to 
discourage  tax  evasion  among  unmarried  couples  who  had  been  making  use  of 
measures designed to support single parents. When the tax advantages these measures 
had once conferred disappeared for unmarried couples, marriages increased not only 
among the wealthy, but also among people who were not paying any income tax, and 
for whom there was no change at all in the amount of tax owed. It would be easy to 
underestimate  the  effect  of  a  policy  that  was  supposed  to  be  limited  to  a  targeted 
population.  
(4) Finally, another difficulty that arises in conducting an empirical analysis is that 
family policies do not operate in a societal vacuum; the effect of a given policy may be 
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strongly dependent upon the social context in which it is implemented. Depending upon 
the policy constellation, economic trends in particular can interact closely with family 
policies  in  influencing  fertility.  By  extension,  fertility  may  be  influenced  by 
developments  in  areas  well  beyond  those  in  the  realm  of  core  family  policies.  (In 
addition  to  economic  policies,  factors  affecting  fertility  rates  may  include  housing 
policies, gender policies, social equity, tax rules, school opening hours, and even the 
overall  structure  of  the  educational  system,  as  mentioned  by  Hoem,  Neyer,  and 
Andersson  2006.)  Public  policies  may  even  serve  to  change  the  context  in  which 
childbearing  behavior  operates,  and  may  therefore  also  have  an  indirect  impact  on 
fertility. While each element may have only an incremental influence, together they 
may add up to something other than the constituent parts. Whether this “something 
other” is more than the parts depends upon how the elements fit into the social system 
(Neyer  and  Andersson  2007).  As  McDonald  (2002,  p.  442)  has  stated,  “the 
effectiveness of any policy will depend on the broader setting. … it is not so much the 
individual  policies  that  matter  as  the  nature  of  the  society  as  a  whole”.  Thus,  in 
effectiveness studies, consideration of the whole policy package may be more relevant 
than  attention  to  stand-alone  policy  details.  An  important  consequence  of  this 
understanding is the recognition that these policies should not be evaluated only on the 
basis of their demographic consequences. For example, it may be shown that policy 
measures intended to increase fertility tend to encourage or discourage female labor 
force participation. Technically, studies of policy effects may need to contain context 
indicators,  including  indicators  of  public  policies  other  than  core  family  policies, 
otherwise  biased  conclusions  may  again  be  reached.  Context  indicators  may  be 
particularly  important  in  international  comparisons.  (Gauthier  and  Hatzius  1997 
courageously include indicators of a welfare state type in their extensive regression 
analysis.) A holistic approach is advisable regardless of the method of analysis one 
uses, whether it is a plain verbal description, hazard or linear regression, or yet another 
method.  Neyer  (2003a,  2006ab;  also  Neyer  and  Andersson  2007)
  has  strongly 
emphasized the need to take into account both the policy context and the symbolic 
meaning  of  public  policies,  in  addition  to  considering  the  specification  of  concrete 
policy parameters.  
In  a  different  take  on  these  issues,  McDonald  (2006;  also  Sleebos  2003)  has 
highlighted the need for insecurity reduction as part of a fertility recovery program, and 
posits that it is incumbent on governments to work toward achieving fertility recovery 
in its own right. (He thus picks  up a thread  from Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995, and 
Hobcraft  1996.)  Such  a  program  would  include  policies  that  promote  healthy  labor 
arrangements  and  economic  stability.  (It  is  notable  how  many  of  our  chapters  for 
countries in  Central and Eastern Europe highlight economic insecurity as a  fertility Hoem: Overview Chapter 8: The impact of public policies on European fertility  
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depressant.)  An  assessment  of  the  efficiency  of  a  program  for  insecurity  reduction 
would indeed require a comprehensive approach to achieve reliable results.  
 
 
3. Conclusion  
By way of conclusion, let us consider what our reflections on research methodology can 
tell us about the likely efficacy of public policies as instruments to steer developments 
of ultimate fertility, deliberately or without intention. The evidence from France and the 
Nordic  countries  suggest  that  it  should  be  possible  to  maintain  a  reasonably  high 
ultimate fertility rate by a coordinated use of public policies in a range of interlocking 
areas (economic policy, employment policy, housing policy, gender policy, core family 
policy, and more) that are implemented in a spirit that furthers childbearing in general, 
and do not just consist of making more money available to married families in selected 
situations (Neyer and Andersson 2007; our chapter on Lithuania contains a particularly 
explicit call for  focused and consistent policies). Fertility regulation  will remain an 
ephemeral goal where such coordination is lacking. Generous arrangements for parental 
leave, child benefits, and childcare may be considered desirable in their own right, but 
such policies alone are unlikely to succeed in raising the fertility level on a grand scale; 
they must be embedded in a family-friendly culture deliberately nurtured by the state 
(McDonald 2002; Neyer and Andersson 2007). (For the same reasons, a culture that is 
friendly to working mothers would not hurt.) Developing such a culture takes time, so 
any government that wants to increase ultimate fertility needs to realize that it faces a 
long-term commitment to broadly conceived policies that go far beyond core family 
policies alone. Even with such policies in place, there is no guarantee that an increase in 
fertility will result. Given the difficulty of pinpointing policy effects, we cannot even be 
sure whether we will ever know in detail which particular policies are successful, and 
which are not. What we can observe may be the effect of a whole policy program. Since 
these kinds of limitations have seldom stopped states from implementing public policies 
in other fields, there should be no reason to be particularly reticent when policies in 
support of the family are designed. 
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